


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1 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Presidential Material on Soviet Air Defenses

I think the material that your people put together for me for the Presidential briefing on Soviet air defenses was excellent. It was intended as a basic look at the scope of the problem and what approaches the Soviets are taking to those problems. It was intended not to give an answer as to what the PK would be against a cruise missile in 1985, but to give some idea of the magnitude of the problem and how much we could hope to know about the Soviets' response to it in the near term. I think it would be worthwhile if we pulled that information together and put it out as an NFAC memorandum of some sort. I suspect there are a lot of more senior policymakers who are going to have to grapple with that problem in the years ahead who could benefit by this kind of a broad view of it.



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DRAFT DIRECTOR'S NOTE

SECRECY

I have recently published a Director's Note on why we have a policy of openness to the public wherever possible. I stressed in that note that this policy does not in any way relax our policy of keeping secrets secret. I want to reemphasize that point because it is critical to our continued success. There are three misunderstandings on the issue of what must be kept secret which I would like to dispell:

1. Because we are being more open, some people believe that every employee can decide what should be revealed. The rules have not changed one whit. Classification authority rests where it always has in the chain of command. Individual employees are no more free than ever to declassify and release classified information. Release to the public is made through the Office of Public Affairs in any event, not by individual employees other than the DDCI and myself. In addition, I want to remind all employees that contact with members of the media for other than social purposes is controlled by HR-\_\_\_\_\_.

Basically because we are an Agency entrusted with many secrets, employee contact with members of the media must be through and with the knowledge of the Office of Public Affairs. Breaches of this policy are serious matters.

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2. Since Watergate and Ellsberg, there has been a tendency to misunderstand the role of "whistle blowing." None of us want excesses or errors to go unreported. The Agency must follow the rules laid down for it precisely. Yet out of Watergate we have devised legitimate alternatives to blowing one's whistle in public:

a. I continue to urge employees to write to me directly and personally, with or without identifying themselves.

b. Employees can report what they believe to be errors to the Inspector General. This provides a mechanism for full and impartial examination of the problem and subsequent review by me.

c. Employees have direct access to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board if they truly believe they will not receive a suitable hearing within the Agency.

As a nation we have lost some perspective on this problem by placing undue emphasis on the right of the individual to express dissent without considering enough the individual's obligation to play a responsible and accountable role. We must have channels for dissent, including going "public" as a last resort; but we also must have a return to relying on the established channels for expressing dissent.

3. Everywhere that I discuss the need for improved security procedures I meet the universal feeling that such advice applies only in the next office, or next agency. Congress thinks the leaks are all in the Executive Branch and vice versa; people in one Executive Department believe they all come from a different Department, etc. It is time that we appreciate the basic fact that leaks and vulnerability to espionage occur everywhere--everywhere. There is a lot to be done to improve security that does lie outside our control. But there is also a lot that is within it.

Are we sure those to whom we  
pass sensitive information have the  
clearances? the need to know?

Do we double talk on phones?

Do we improperly take classified  
materials out of our buildings (our  
spot checks say yes)?

Do we xerox controlled materials?

Do we put more detail on sources  
and methods in our written materials  
than is necessary to achieve our purpose?  
In discussing some support activity do  
we give away the nature of a classified  
operation being supported?

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This problem of tightening our own internal security procedures within the Agency is as high on my concerns today as any other. I ask your diligent and imaginative cooperation. We can not be complacent. Security is the responsibility of each one of us.

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